Board Structure As A Signaling Proxy Of Ipo Quality: A Study On Bursa Malaysia Second Board Firms

dc.contributor.authorChong, Ching Woon
dc.date.accessioned2016-10-14T02:36:23Z
dc.date.available2016-10-14T02:36:23Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractThe IPO underpricing phenomenon has long fascinated academicians in the effort of finding the rational for the anomaly. Similarly, the relationship of corporate governance with firm performance is often investigated. Certo, Daily and Dalton (2001) are the first to combine these two areas of researches by exploring on the board structure as the signaling proxy for firm quality during initial public offering (IPO). Consistent with the signaling theory, their results show that board size and board reputation are inversely correlated with IPO underpricing; but board composition and board leadership structure are not inversely correlated with IPO underpricing. This study extends their research to Bursa Malaysia Second Board IPOs in an effort of finding the shown signaling effect. A total of 114 IPQ sample firms for period of 2001 to 2007 were included in this study. The findings however found no empirical support that board structure plays a role in signaling firm value thus reduces underpricing. However, this study found that the level of underpricing for the Second Board over the 2001-2007 period as measured by market adjusted initial return had reduced substantially (average 21.37%) as compared to earlier Second Board study (average 101.57%) of How, Jelic, Saadouni and Verheoeven (2006) for the period of 1989-2000.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2749
dc.subjectThe IPO underpricing phenomenonen_US
dc.subjecthas long fascinated academiciansen_US
dc.titleBoard Structure As A Signaling Proxy Of Ipo Quality: A Study On Bursa Malaysia Second Board Firmsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
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