Penggunaan Esos Sebagai Mekanisma Penyelarasan Kepentingan Di Malaysia: Suatu Kepadanan Antara Masalah Dan Penyelesaian
| dc.contributor.author | Ghazali, Zahiruddin | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-10-13T08:38:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-10-13T08:38:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008-11 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Executive' Share Option Scheme (ESOS) has always been used as an instrument to converge the interests of managers with that of the owners (type I agency problem) particularly when the share ownership is dispersed. However, of late ESOS adoption has been popular among the firms with high ownership concentration where owners are also part of the management (type II agency problem). Therefore, this study aims to understand the reasons for adopting ESOS in an environment where owners are already part of the management team and there is no information asymmetry problem as faced under the type I agency problem. Using matched pair methodology, it study determinants of ESOS adoptions, decision to include or exclude retention clause, firm's post performances, and executive' remuneration on 428 listed firms (214 adopters and 214 matched pair non-adopters) in Malaysian Bourse. Overall, the study finds that the decision to issue or adopt ESOS is driven by moral hazard behaviour, though this is balance (albeit only weakly) by the presence of institutional investors including the government. In determinants of ESOS study, only change in size is found to be important and in-line with the theory, but could be subjected to earning management manipulation by the firm. Family owned firms are likely to adopt ESOS than other types of firms. This finding question the ultimate motive of family owned firms especially in light of high ownership concentration. Moreover, family owned firms would incline not to include retention clause in the ESOS, fuelling the debate further. ESOS adoption also fails to be a catalyst for better post-performance as evidenced by non-statistical significance between adopters and non-adopters. Lastly, evidence from the study shows that executive' remuneration is not being used to reward managers based on performances and family owned firms are likely to give higher remuneration than any other type of firms confirming the priori. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2736 | |
| dc.subject | Business Administration | en_US |
| dc.subject | Executive' Share Option Scheme | en_US |
| dc.title | Penggunaan Esos Sebagai Mekanisma Penyelarasan Kepentingan Di Malaysia: Suatu Kepadanan Antara Masalah Dan Penyelesaian | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
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